Chicago bid for, and was ultimately selected by the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), the right to become an applicant city to host the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) subsequently approved Chicago as one of four candidate cities. This paper examines Chicago's ultimately failed bid in light of the multi-dimensional intersecting political and economic considerations on the part of the IOC, USOC, the Chicago2016 committee and the city as each pursued separate agendas shaped by their political economies. Disputes between the IOC and USOC relating to the appropriation of broadcast and sponsorship revenues and the character of Chicago's bid in light of the commercial emphasis and character of the Games by previous host U.S. host cities played prominent roles in explaining Chicago's failure. Other cities can learn from the Chicago experience, and this article is a primer on strategies applicant cities should avoid in the pursuit of Olympic gold.
The selection of a host city for the Olympic Games by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) reflects both the political and economic character of the event. The IOC must project an objectivity and fairness in making its selection, the political dimension, while pursuing the -rent-seeking‖ characteristic of all monopolists, the economic dimension. The political economy that defines IOC behavior as it relates to the selection process can be illuminated through a case study. The purpose of this paper is to use Chicago's bid to host the 2016 Summer Olympic Games to provide insight into IOC decision-making. Shedding some light on what many view as an opaque process may prove beneficial to applicant and candidate cities as they formulate and execute a winning strategy for hosting the Games.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section identifies and analyzes IOC political motivations. The IOC functions as a monopolistic supplier, but its authority comes at the grace of the international community. Capricious decision-making, or the perception of such, could undermine that authority. The third portion of the paper discusses the rent-seeking of the IOC, to include the extent to which it relies on the Summer and Winter Olympic Games and broadcast revenues to finance its operation.
The fourth section of the paper explores the IOC and USOC dispute regarding broadcast revenues. The fifth portion of the paper focuses on the character of Chicago's bid in pursuit of the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. Conclusions and policy implications are delineated in the paper's final section.
II. The Politics of the International Olympic Committee
Voting members of the IOC ultimately select the host city for the Summer and Winter Olympic Games. A candidate city's chances of successfully bidding for the Games are enhanced through obtaining information and understanding the criteria, to include strategic interests and concerns that guide the IOC selection process. The strategic response of a National Olympic Committee (NOC) to its perception of the IOC's evaluative process is amenable to game-theory analysis. A logical predicate to that analysis is to consider IOC motivations in choosing a host. The IOC, as noted in the introduction, must give the impression of objectivity and transparency if it is going to maintain its authority. The IOC must represent the wishes and desires of the international community, and as those evolve so must the IOC. Maintaining transparency can be advanced through following a standard selection process; an articulation of a set of criteria that govern the selection of a host city; and assembling an IOC membership involved in the selection process that represents the world. An analysis of each of these items follows.
The selection process has been codified in the Olympic Charter, which is subject The Charter makes absolutely clear the organizational hierarchy; the IOC is the supreme authority, and the National Olympic Committees must play by the rules articulated and agree to accept IOC rulings on all matters relating to the conduct of the Olympic Games.
The values that the IOC embraces and promotes through the Games, the -Fundamental Principles of Olympism,‖ are clearly articulated as well. To wit:
Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles.
The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity. Any application to host Olympic Games must be submitted to the IOC by the competent public authorities of the applicant city together with the approval of the NOC of the country. Such authorities and the NOC must guarantee that the Olympic Games will be organized to the satisfaction of and under the conditions required by the IOC.
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When there is only one applicant city, as was the case for 1984, the applicant city and the IOC share authority as it relates to the conduct of the Games and the sharing of rents from them. The payoffs for the IOC and the NOC in this situation are either zero, the outcome if the applicant city withdraws its bid or the IOC cancels the Games, or some finite return that will depend on the negotiating strengths of the two parties. Both the IOC and NOC would choose to hold the Games as long as the costs they incur are exceeded by the benefits derived if the Games are held. It is safe to say that the IOC did not fare as well for 1984 had there been other applicant cities while the City of Los
Angeles fared better than they would have had there been competition to host the Games.
This practical observation is made despite the following language in the Olympic
Charter:
Any surplus incurred by a host city, an OCOG, or the NOC of the country of a host city as a result of the celebration of an Olympic Games shall be applied to the development of the Olympic Movement and of sport.
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-Surplus‖ is subject to interpretation and practice. The applicant city could reduce costs by providing less in the way of infrastructure than that perceived as appropriate by the IOC. Alternatively, the IOC or the NCO could spend money in ways that are inconsistent with the ideals expressed in the Olympic Charter but sufficient to eliminate any surplus. Table 2 . Table 3 combines the information from Tables 1 and 2 and provides rank orders by geographic area for both representation and successful bids. Table 3 are for Games actually held.
b When ranks are tied the convention is to average the ranks in the ascending order of values for the purposes of computing the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (Spearman's Rho).
The information exhibited in Table 3 does not yield a statistically significant Spearman rho or Kendall Tau coefficient (this, in part, is attributable to the ties identified with the two rank orders and the small number of observations).
While it cannot be concluded that there is a statistically significant relationship in the rank orders, three things are worth noting: First, the very top of the rankings does indicate that the selection of a host city favors those countries that have the greatest representation of current IOC members. 13 Second, the frequency of selection of a city from the United States or Canada is far greater than is reflected in the IOC membership of those two nations. Third, selection has favored the developed world.
The bias toward developed countries, however, may be changing. The 14 13 It should be emphasized that the IOC representation is based on the current roster of representatives. The extent to which that representation has changed over time obscures, perhaps vitiates, any correlation between representation numbers and successful bid attempts. A more exacting technique in establishing the relationship between representation and winning bids would require identifying the composition of the IOC at the time the selection occurred for each of the 31 host city designations. 14 It should be noted that the idea that mega sports events induce a growth in economic activity is not supported by economics scholarship. The popular perception and promise that mega events induce economic growth has trumped research undertaken by academics economists to a significant degree in guiding decision making as it relates to the pursuit of hosting mega events by countries and cities.
Summarizing the political dimension as it relates to the selection of a host city, a case can be made that it is important for an applicant host city and its NOC to develop a relationship with the IOC to include an operational endorsement of IOC values as articulated in the Olympic Charter. It also appears to be advantageous for the applicant city to be from Europe, where IOC representation is strongest. Strategically speaking, it is also essential to recognize the hierarchy as it relates to Olympism: the IOC is the supreme authority in all matters relating to the Olympic Games. IOC authority extends to the distribution of rents derived from the Olympic Games, and it would be a strategic mistake, ordinarily, for an NOC to pursue economic rents derived from hosting the Games at the expense of the IOC. A discussion of the -rent-seeking‖ by the IOC is discussed and analyzed in the paper's next section.
In addition to the potential geopolitical distribution of IOC voting members, the voting model itself -a series of rounds in which the 100+ delegates choose one favorite, with the city garnering the fewest number of votes being eliminated each time -may add complexity and intrigue. Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow compared many voting systems in terms of their likely impact. His -impossibility theorem‖ exposes the flaws in whatever rule is chosen, and the possibility that the consensus best city -or candidatemay not prevail in the end.
In the selection process for the 2012 Games, for example, Madrid received the highest number of votes by far in Round 2 but was eliminated in Round 3, leaving It should be noted that the in the Olympic Charter the IOC is identified as a not-for-profit entity. Rent as used in this paper refers to "well-being" as opposed to profit. The operative assumption is that the IOC functions in a way that maximizes the difference between its total benefit and its total cost. The end to which that difference is used by the IOC is not material to this analysis. 17 While the IOC could be identified as a monopolist as it relates to the conduct of the Olympic Games, in terms of operational structure, it is more akin to a cartel in that there are regional blocks and more than 100 voting members with varying interests.
right to the use thereof, belong exclusively to the IOC, including but not limited to the use for any profit-making, commercial or advertising purposes. The IOC may license all of part of its right on terms and conditions set forth by the IOC Executive Board.
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This language leaves no doubt with regard to the appropriation of revenues relating to the conduct of the Games. Footnote 6 in the Charter specifies, furthermore, that -Games will be organized to the satisfaction of and under the conditions required by the IOC.‖ It is tautological to say that the said organization maximizes IOC well-being.
Finally, the IOC specifies how any surplus generated by a host city, and by extension its NOC, should be used (see footnote 10 in this chapter). Any surplus is put to a use consistent with IOC objectives and values, and is, therefore, consistent with maximizing its well-being rather than that of the host city or NOC.
Rent-seeking involves not only the appropriation of revenues favorable to the monopolist, but maximizing the revenues made available by the host city through the conduct of the Games. The IOC can be thought of as a contest designer and the applicant cities as contestants. Theoretically, the contestant submitting the highest bid wins the prize, the right to host the Games. (Political and personal considerations, of course, could alter this calculus. Rio de Janeiro's geographic-diversity appeal and Juan Antonio Samaranch's personal plea on behalf of Madrid were sufficient to offset Chicago's likely financial advantage in bidding for the 2016 Olympic Summer Olympic Games.) Rentseeking viewed from this perspective requires a contest design that maximizes the value of applicant bids. The features of the contest are that it involves multiple stages and that the outcome is winner-take-all. There are actually three stages in bidding for the Games.
Applicant cities must first be selected by their NOCs since the Olympics organizational structure emphasizes the relationship between the IOC and the NOCs. Once the NOCs select a city, then the IOC selects candidate sites among the applicant cities submitted by
NOCs. The selection of the host city does to some degree reflect the nature of the relationship between an NOC and the IOC. This is important to note because tensions between the IOC and an NOC could diminish an applicant city's chances of winning.
Research has revealed a couple of things with regard to the design of contests.
There are two theoretical outcomes that are most relevant for this analysis. First, in the case of either linear or concave cost functions as it relates to bidding for the Games, the contest designer --the IOC in this case --maximizes revenues (bids) by adopting a single-prize strategy. 19 The IOC apparently believes that the cost function facing applicant cities is linear or concave, and that perception is arguably correct. If the cost function is shaped primarily by an -ability parameter‖ unique to each applicant (the ability parameter is independently distributed, privately processed information), then it appears reasonable to assume that bidding costs decline beyond a certain point, especially for those cities that are generally favored to win. The courting between an NOC and its applicant city very likely promotes a feeling of confidence particularly when the applicant city is well-positioned to meet IOC infrastructure demands. Beyond the infrastructure needed to accommodate the Games, the costs are relatively small, and this suggests a concave cost function. It is conceivable, furthermore, that the multi-stage construct encourages higher bids for the Games among candidate cities given their investment at the applicant city stage. The higher the sunk costs for applicant cities, the more financially aggressive they are likely to be at the candidate-city stage of the competition in an effort to recoup their costs.
20 Theoretically, the winner's valuation of the good varies directly with the number of bidders. Here it is assumed that the number of bidders equal the number of the cities that submit applications at the first stage of the process. The winning bid is conditioned by the bids submitted. The information that each bidder uses might well have a temporal dimension as well, as information on past winning bids is used to condition present bids. A "first-order-statistic" such as the perceived greatest economic impact recorded from the games or the perceived mean economic impact.
The IOC depends on the Olympic Games to finance its operations, and so maximizing well-being is tantamount to maximizing the difference between revenues and costs from the Games. It could be argued the modern Olympics story is about commerce and money (Barney et al. 2002) , and if that assertion is true, then the modern Olympic story is about broadcast revenue and its control. Indeed, it would seem that television and the Olympics were made for one another. Sport has the capacity to attract large audiences, and only the World Cup has the global television appeal of the Summer Olympic Games. Table 4 identifies trends relating to the distribution of revenue from television broadcast rights between the IOC and host cities. Several things are worth noting. First, the share of broadcast revenues emanating from the U.S. has diminished but stabilized to slightly over 50 percent. Second, the percentage of broadcast revenues originating in Europe currently approximates a quarter of all broadcast revenues. Third, the United States and Europe together account for about 75 percent of broadcast revenues, which means that approximately 25 percent originate from the‖ rest of the world‖. It should not be surprising, perhaps, that Rio de Janeiro, as part of the rest-of-the-world, was awarded the 2016 Games given the growing importance of broadcast revenues from places other than the United States and Europe.
IV.
The IOC and USOC Dispute Regarding Broadcast Revenues
As established above, broadcast revenues are the financial life-blood of the IOC.
Since the IOC distributes 90 percent of its revenues to the International Sports
Federations and NOCs, those entities depend on broadcast monies as well. Given that the distribution of broadcast funds is a zero-sum game, the significant portion of broadcast revenues appropriated by the USOC has become a major source of tension not only between the USOC and the IOC, but between the USOC and the 204 other NOCs. Tim The conventional wisdom appears to be that until that dispute is resolved, the U.S. will not serve as a host for the Summer Games in the future.
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Ueberroth's perception of the changed risk-reward profile reflected not only the commonly perceived political antipathy directed toward the U.S. over revenue-sharing, but the inability of the U.S. to -present a clear partnership between city, state, and federal officials.‖ 29 Chicago's failed bid likely has bolstered the impression articulated by Ueberroth, and if the U.S. does not bid for future Games that will likely have a negative impact on IOC financial expectations for future Games. Given the fact that the total costs involved for any candidate city in just bidding for the Games will likely exceed $50 million, 30 cities may be less inclined to bid.
On the other hand, the IOC, in awarding the 2016 Olympics Games to Rio de Janeiro, may be anticipating that future revenue streams from the Games will be less dependent upon U.S. and European markets. Future Olympic audiences will be more Asian and South American, and the IOC may benefit long-term from developing markets in those parts of the world in which there is a larger potential audience. That strategy, of course, depends on the continued economic development of the world's populous areas, and that is not a certainty.
While the USOC-IOC dispute regarding the distribution of revenues from the Olympic Games does not explain entirely Chicago's unsuccessful bid for the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. Chicago's bid was generally considered strong, but in retrospect there were flaws. In the final analysis the bid's strengths were not sufficient to offset USOC mismanagement particularly as it related to the creation of USON. The next section of the chapter discusses the history of the Chicago bid and the flaws that doomed it.
V. Chicago's Bid
In a public announcement on Given the costs of even bidding for the right to host the Olympic Games, minimizing risk requires that cities and NOCs understand the essentials of winning bids.
The USOC did little to follow even the most essential ingredients of a recipe for securing the Games, and Chicago's loss was in part at least attributable to USOC mismanagement.
A good starting point for future bids by U.S. cities is to ensure that the USOC and the candidate city are following a blueprint that impresses upon delegates the embrace of the values articulated by the Olympic Movement and cultivates vital relationships with the IOC and its delegates. Failure to do so coupled with global economic and political realignment, will result in further disappointment and frustration for the U.S in bidding for future Games.
